Starting from the reward-risk model for portfolio selection introduced in De Giorgi (2004), we derive the reward-risk Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) analogously to the mean-variance CAPM. The reward-risk portfolio selection arises from an axiomatic definition of reward and risk measures based on few properties, one of them being the isotonicity with respect to the second order stochastic dominance. We show that at any financial market equilibrium, investors' optimal allocation are comonotonic and the pricing kernel is an increasing function of the market portfolio, that corresponds to the increments of the distortion function characterizing investors' risk measures. Finally, we test the reward-risk CAPM on market data for several choices of the distortion function.
1 Introduction the second order stochastic dominance, besides other properties, in order to avoid paradoxical preferences when compared to the Expected Utility paradigm. We also give a unique characterization of reward measures (the mean) and we suggest a class of risk measures for portfolio selection, that are related to the Choquet Expected Utility Theory. In this setup, a risk measure arises from a convex distortion of the physical survival distribution function. Moreover, the portfolio decision problem based on the Choquet expectation can be formulated as linear quintile regression, as showed by Bassett, Koenker, and Kordas (2004) . A large class of risk measures proposed in the literature can be represented in this way, as discussed in De Giorgi (2004) . In this paper we consider the reward-risk model for portfolio selection introduced in De Giorgi (2004) and we study the financial market equilibria, in order to obtain a possible extension of the CAPM resulting from the mean-variance analysis, to a similar equilibrium model in the reward-risk setup. We show that if markets are complete, then investors' optimal allocations are comonotonic, analogously to the Tobin separation in the classical mean-variance approach. Moreover, at any financial market equilibrium, the Capital Asset Pricing Model holds, where the pricing kernel is not the market portfolio as in the mean-variance CAPM, but a strictly decreasing function of it, that corresponds to the increments of the investors' distortion function at the optimal allocations. The comonotonicity of investors' optimal allocations implies that at equilibrium the market is also comonotonic to every investor's consumption. Moreover, it follows that financial market equilibria exist only if all investors possess the same distortion function, i.e. the same reward-risk setup. Finally, we test the market efficiency with respect to the reward-risk setup and the rewardrisk CAPM, for a large class of strictly convex distortion functions characterized by a unique parameter. We select the distortion that minimizes the statistics associated to the J-test for over-identifying restrictions. It follows that the parameter of the distortion which minimize the test statistics can interpreted as the investor's degree of pessimism, as introduced in Bassett, Koenker, and Kordas (2004) . The empirical analysis based on market data from 1932 to 2002 shows that investors are lightly pessimistic. Moreover, the estimated parameter and the associated risk measure provide a pricing kernel near to that obtained for the mean-semivariance CAPM. Recently, Post and Van Vilet (2004) also provide empirical evidence in favor of the meansemivariance CAPM. However, the analysis of Post and Van Vilet (2004) is restricted to the mean-semivariance CAPM versus the mean-variance CAPM, imposing the corresponding model for the pricing kernel and without any equilibrium consideration. In this paper, we start with a general model for investors' reward-risk preferences and obtain the reward-risk CAPM from the study of financial market equilibria. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the reward-risk portfolio selection problem and we derive the reward-risk Capital Asset Pricing Model. In Section 3, we test empirically the market efficiency based on the reward-risk CAPM. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We consider a two-periods exchange economy. The model setup follows Duffie (1988) . Let Ω = {1, . . . , S} denote the state of nature at the final period T . F = 2 Ω is the power algebra on Ω, i.e. the set of all possible events arising from Ω. Uncertainty is modeled by the probability space (Ω, F, P), where the probability measure P on Ω satisfies p s = P {s} > 0 for all s = 1, . . . , S, i.e. every state of the world have strictly positive probability to occur. The space G of real-valued measurable functions is endowed with the scalar product
There are K + 1 assets with payoffs A k . The asset 0 is the risk-free asset with payoff A 0 = 1. The supply of risky assets is exogenously given and denoted by θ k > 0 (k = 1, . . . , K), while the risk-free asset is in elastic supply with exogenously given price 1 1+r
, where r > 0 is the risk-free rate of return. The marketed subspace X is the span of (A k ) k=0,1,...,K . Without loss of generality, we assume that no-redundant assets exist, i.e. dim(X ) = K+1, where obviously K + 1 ≤ S. The market portfolio is the sum of all available risky assets, i.e.ω =
There are i = 1, . . . , I investors, initially endowed with wealth w i > 0. The numbers θ i k denote the amount of security k held by agent i, q k denotes the k-th security price. Thus, when trading these securities, the agent can attain the consumption plan
Note that B i is a convex set. Agents evaluate consumption plans according to a risk-reward pair (µ, ρ i ), where µ(X) = E X and ρ i : G → R is a risk measure as defined in De Giorgi (2004, Theorem 4.2). The measure ρ i satisfies the following four properties: convexity, the risk of the zero payoff is zero, invariance with respect to adding risk-free positions and, finally, the isotonicity with respect to the second order stochastic dominance. The measure ρ i arises from an axiomatic definition of risk measures based on the four properties listed above. Note that we do not impose the same measure of risk for all investors. In fact, investors' perception of risk can differ and thus also the way of measuring it (Weber and Milliman 1997) , as long as the four properties above are satisfied.
(ii) ∃ Y ∈ X such that q(Y ) ≤ w i and one of the following two statements is satisfied
From De Giorgi (2004, Theorem 2.1), X ∈ X is (µ, ρ i )-efficient iff X is budget feasible and uniquely minimizes the function
exists a convex, non-decreasing function g i on [0, 1], with g i (0) = 0 and g i (1) = 1 such that
and F X is the cumulative distribution function of X under P. The convex function g i is called distortion and uniquely characterizes investors' risk preferences. Moreover, the function R i corresponds to a Choquet integral and is related to the Non-Expected Utility Theory of Schmeidler (1989) . Therefore, the investor's portfolio choice problem is:
or equivalently max
We introduce the following definition:
Definition 2.1 (Financial market equilibrium). Given a risk-free rate r, a financial market equilibrium consists of a price vectorq ∈ R K+1 withq 0 = 1 1+r and allocationsX i ∈ X for i = 1, ..., I, such that
The property (ii) in Definition 2.1, says that the sum of investors' optimal allocations is the market portfolio plus the exogenously supplied number of risk-free assets. In fact, the market portfolio has been defined as just the sum of supplied risky assets. Instead of using Definition 2.1 directly, we first impose some restrictions on the equilibrium pricesq. Note that here the goal function R i is strictly monotone and therefore a necessary condition for the portfolio decision problem given above to have a solution (and thus, in order property (i) of the previous definition to be satisfied) is that consumers cannot exploit an arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, a necessary condition for the existence of market equilibria is that the following equation holds:
where G + is the subset of elements in G with non-negative outcomes in all states of nature. Equation (4) means that non-negative payoffs must have strictly positive price, if not the zero payoff. In fact, if equation (4) fails to be true for some price vector q, then investors can freely obtain a positive payoff in all state of nature, that is strictly positive in at least one state of nature. Therefore, they could infinitely increase their objective function and no optimal solution to their investment problem would exist. A price vector q ∈ R K+1 such that equation (4) is satisfied, is said to be arbitrage free for the marketed subspace X . The following Lemma holds.
Lemma 2.1 (Existence of the pricing portfolio). Let q ∈ R K+1 be an arbitrage free price vector for the marketed subspace X . Then it exists ℓ ∈ X , E P ℓ = 1 such that
for all X ∈ X and q(X) ≥ 0.
Proof. The arbitrage free equation (4) implies that
Let define the convex subspace of G by K = {X ∈ X | q(X) ≤ 0}, i.e. the set of marketed allocation with negative price. Moreover, let
then by the Farka's Lemma we find a linear functional Ψ on G with Ψ(X) = 0 for X ∈ K and Ψ(Y ) > 0 for Y ∈ P. Moreover, by the Riesz Representation Theorem (see Duffie 1988 , Chapter I.6) we find ψ ∈ G with Ψ(
and a probability measure π on (Ω, F) by π(s) = ℓ(s)p s . We have
Consider the following investment: Borrow θ 0 = −1 units of the risk-free asset, to finance
From the computation above, we see that for an arbitrage free price vector q ∈ R K+1 , we find ℓ ∈ G such that
By construction ℓ > 0 and E P ℓ = 1. Note that ℓ may not be an element of X , but since we restrict the pricing rule just described to X , we can assume without loss of generality 1 that ℓ ∈ X . In fact, if ℓ / ∈ X , we can decompose ℓ into one part ℓ in X and one part ℓ ⊥ orthogonal to X . Since for all X ∈ X , ℓ ⊥ · X = 0, the pricing rule can be rewritten as ℓ · X. Moreover, since 1 ∈ X , 0 = ℓ ⊥ · 1 = E P ℓ ⊥ . Thus, we assume ℓ ∈ X and E P ℓ = 1.
ℓ is called the pricing portfolio (Duffie 1988) or ideal security (Magill and Quinzii 1996) . Using the pricing portfolio ℓ we can rewrite the budget set as B i = {X ∈ X | ℓ·X ≤ (1+r) w i } and the no-arbitrage decision problem of investor i is given by
An equivalent definition of financial market equilibria is now the following:
Definition 2.2. Given a risk-free rate r, a financial market equilibrium consists of a price vectorl ∈ X and allocationsX i ∈ X for i = 1, ..., I, such that (i)X i maximizes −R i subject tol · X ≤ (1 + r) w i for i = 1, ..., I, and
We now come back to the individual portfolio choice of equations (2) and (3). We rewrite the function R i using its integral representation (1). Let consider X ∈ G and take a permutation ζ of Ω = {1, . . . , S} such that X(ζ(1)) ≤ X(ζ(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ X(ζ(S)). Then
Note that q 
since g i is convex. Moreover,
Note that
where
is a positive, non-increasing function of x, since g i is non-decreasing and convex. Moreover, by definition, f i X (X) ∈ G with
Thus, the vector f i X (X) ∈ G is a probability measure on (Ω, F) and the functional R i is the negative expectation with respect to f i X (X) ∈ G. Similar results are given by Carlier and Dana (2003) for non atomic spaces. The optimization problem (6) can be rewritten as
where λ i is the Lagrange multiplier. Let
(1 + r) w i be the Lagrange function. The following relationship between any efficient allocationX i and the pricing portfolio is satisfied. 
Proof. (i) We prove: ℓ ·X
is strictly monotone and the risk-less asset exists,X i must satisfy the budget restriction with equality, i.e. ℓ ·X i = (1 + r) w i .
(ii) We prove:
Let ζ be a permutation of Ω such thatX
Without loss of generality, for ǫ > 0 small enough, + 1) ), then we take the permutationζ of Ω such thatζ(l) = ζ(l) for all l = s, s + 1 andζ(s) = ζ(s + 1),ζ(s + 1) = ζ(s).
and thus
Since this is true for all Z ∈ span(ℓ)
This completes the proof. Now suppose that markets are complete, i.e. X = G. Then f iX i (X i ) ∈ X and thus
From the previous Theorem, we immediately obtain the following result on the optimal allocationsX i , i = 1, . . . , I.
Corollary 2.1.
. . , I. Suppose that the corresponding distortions g i are strictly convex for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then if K + 1 = S, i.e. markets are complete, the optimal payoffsX 1 , . . . ,X I are comonotonic, i.e. for all s, s ′ ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , I} we have
. . , I. The functions f iX i are strictly decreasing, since the g i 's are strictly convex. Suppose now that for s, s
therefore alsoX j (s) ≥X j (s ′ ) for any j ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Moreover, the inequality is strict for X j if it is forX i .
This last Corollary states that investors' optimal allocations are comonotonic, i.e. cannot be used as hedge of each other. This is a well-known result from the classical mean-variance model, that is directly implied by the Tobin Separation. The comonotonicity of investors' optimal payoffs immediately implies the following property of the pricing portfoliol at any financial market equilibrium.
Corollary 2.2. Let (l,X 1 , . . . ,X i ) be a financial market equilibrium. Suppose that the corresponding distortions g i are strictly convex for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then if K + 1 = S, i.e. markets are complete, there exists a strictly decreasing function f such that f (ω) = ℓ and f (ω) = f ĩ ω (ω) for all i = 1, . . . , I.
Proof. From the previous Corollary, we have that all optimal payoffsX i (i = 1, . . . , I) are comonotonic and therefore also the sums I i=1X i and
By definition of financial market equilibrium, we find α 0 ∈ R such thatω = I i=1X i + α 0 1. Therefore,ω is also comonotonic toX 1 , . . . ,X I and thus f
for some i = 1, . . . , I.
The last Corollary also implies a necessary condition for the existence of financial market equilibria. In fact, since f
. Obviously, this last equation is true because of the strict comonotonicity stated in Corollary 2.1. We are now able to prove the Security Market Line Theorem.
Theorem 2.2. Let (l,X 1 , . . . ,X i ) be a financial market equilibrium and q(ω) > 0. Suppose that the corresponding distortions g i are strictly convex for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then if K + 1 = S, i.e. markets are complete, for all X ∈ X :
and Rω =ω
. Therefore For X ∈ X
Proof. (i)ω and Rω are comonotonic.
Thus,ω and Rω are comonotonic.
(ii) Sinceω and Rω are comonotonic, then f (ω) = f (Rω), where f is defined as in the proof of the previous Corollary. Moreover, for X ∈ X
We call the factor cov
3 Empirical analysis
be the k-th asset return for k = 1, . . . , K and r t = (r 1,t , . . . , r K,t ) ′ be the observation of the risky assets' returns (R 1 , . . . , R K )
′ at time t = 1, . . . , τ . The function F :
where 1 rt≤r is the vector (1 r 1,t ≤r 1 , . . . , 1 r K,t ≤r K ) ′ . We suppose that assets' returns are independent and identically distributed with multivariate cumulative distribution F . Let rω ,t be the observation at time t = 1, . . . , τ of the market portfolio return Rω =ω
and G be its empirical distribution function, i.e. for κ ∈ R
We consider several increasing, strictly convex distortions g on [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1, parameterized by a one-dimensional parameter γ, which can be interpreted as the degree of risk aversion or pessimism (Bassett, Koenker, and Kordas 2004) . We compute the corresponding increments with respect to the empirical distribution function G, i.e. for κ ∈ {rω ,1 , . . . , rω ,τ }: where r is as before the risk-free rate of return. The Table 3 reports the estimated parameters for the several choices of the distortion g. According to the Theorem 2.2 and equation (8), the null hypothesis to be tested is that E ǫ k = 0 for k = 1, . . . , K, wherê
andǫ k,t = f Rω (rω ,t ) (r k,t − r). As in Post and Van Vilet (2004) we use the Hansen's (1982) J-test for over-identifying restrictions based on the Generalized Method of Moments (for an overview see also Davidson and Mackinnon 1993, Chapter 17.6) . The test statistic is given by JT = τǫ ′ W −1 τǫ , where
Under the null hypothesis the test statistic is χ 2 (K − 1) asymptotically distributed. The value of the test statistic JT for the several choices of the one-parametric distortion g are reported in Table 3 together with the corresponding significance levels. (long dashed line). The test statistic are reported in Table 3 . The short dashed line corresponds to the estimate of the pricing kernel based on the third order stochastic dominance provided by Post and van Vilet (2004) .
